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Abstract 
Software safety testing is important to critical software in Avionics; however, the safety test requirements are usually 
not clear during system-level testing. Considering software safety engineering and software test theory, this paper 
researches software safety testing based on STPA. It proposes a software safety test framework which includes 4 
phases: software safety test planning, software safety test design, software safety test implementation and software 
safety test assessment; then to obtain software safety test requirements in safety testing, it introduces a method of 
software safety test requirements elicitation based on STPA, and an example is given to explain how to put it into use.  
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1. Introduction 
Airborne Software includes aircraft information management and command control systems, and 
platforms (such as embedded real-time operating system), on which these systems relied, etc. Modern 
avionics systems transit from electronic machinery-intensive to software-intensive, and software plays an 
increasingly important role in implementing safety critical function, controlling and eliminating the 
hazards. In recent years, the loss of life, property, and other major disasters caused by software fault in the 
field of aviation are presented upward trend. Therefore it’s necessary to do safety testing for the safety-
critical software. 
Previously there are some standards to describe the software safety engineering, such as NASA-
8719[1], Software System Safety Handbook [2], DO-178B [3], etc. In these standards, there is a safety 
team to do the safety work, such as safety analysis, and software safety testing can be involved in the 
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normal test. However, in the engineering practice, the software to be tested usually only be assigned a 
safety critical level, and rarely mentioned or identified safety requirements in the specification. So the 
biggest difficulty in safety testing is the software safety test requirements are not clear. 
One of the most important ways to get software safety requirements is safety analysis, and determines 
what failures and failure combinations to be tested. Traditional safety analysis techniques are extension of 
the hardware analysis into the software area, such as Software Fault Tree Analysis (SFTA) and Software 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (SFMEA), and were developed for the simpler, loosely coupled 
systems of the past and are becoming less effective as system complexity and coupling increases. Because 
current analysis techniques primarily focused on failure events, while most current faults in software-
intensive systems is not due to an accident caused by component failure, but because of the uncontrolled 
interaction between components [4]. A second reason is that those analysis techniques work on an existing 
design. However, usually system test cases need to be designed in the requirement phase, and become 
impractical to wait until a design is completed to perform a safety analysis on. 
STPA (System-Theoretic Processes Analysis) on the base of STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident 
Modeling and Processes), which is a new causality model that expands the potential causes of accidents 
considered and consider safety as a dynamic control problem rather than simply a component failure or 
component reliability problem. Accidents result from lack of enforcement of the safety constraints 
(constraints on the system state or behavior required to ensure safety) by the system design or by 
operations, and occur when the control structure or control actions do not enforce the safety constraints, 
resulting in unhandled environmental disturbances or conditions, unhandled or uncontrolled component 
failures, or unsafe interactions among system components [4]. 
This paper researches software safety testing based on STPA, and is organized as follows: in section 2 
some definitions are given, in section 3 a framework of software safety testing is designed, in section 4 a 
method of software safety test requirements elicitation based on STPA is introduced and an example of 
applying it is given. Finally it draws a conclusion about the study and the plans for future work. 
2. Definition 
Accident: An accident is an unplanned and undesired loss event (involve human death and injury, and 
other major losses, including mission, equipment, financial, and information losses) [4]. 
Safety: Freedom from accidents (loss events) [5]. 
Hazard: A system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case 
environmental conditions, will lead to an accident [5]. 
Hazard Analysis: Hazard analysis is the process of identifying hazards and their potential causal factors 
[5]. 
STAMP: The STAMP model of accident causation is built on these three basic concepts—safety 
constraints, a hierarchical safety control structure, and process models—along with basic systems theory 
concepts. In STAMP systems are viewed as interrelated components kept in a state of dynamic 
equilibrium by feedback control loops. Safety is a control problem where the goal of the control is to 
enforce the safety constraints. Accidents in STAMP are the result of a complex process that results in the 
system behavior violating the safety constraints. The safety constraints are enforced by the control loops 
between the various levels of the hierarchical control structure that are in place during design, 
development, manufacturing, and operations. Accidents are seen as resulting from inadequate control or 
enforcement of constraints on safety-related behavior at each level of the system development and system 
operations control structures [4]. 
STPA: It’s a new approach to hazard analysis, which based on the STAMP causality model. The 
primary goal for STPA technique is to identify accident scenarios that encompass the entire accidents 
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process, includes design errors, including software flaws; component interaction accidents; cognitively 
complex human decision-making errors; and social, organizational, and management factors contributing 
to accidents. An additional goal in the design of STPA was to provide guidance to the users in getting 
good results. The third and final goal for STPA is that it can be used before a design has been created, that 
is, it provides the information necessary to guide the design process, rather than requiring a design to exist 
before the analysis can start [4]. 
Software Safety Requirements (SSRs): SSRs are derived from the system and subsystem safety 
requirements, which were developed to mitigate hazards identified in the Preliminary, System, and 
Subsystems Hazard Analyses. Additional requirements may be imposed by standards, organizational 
requirements, and other sources [1]. 
Software Safety Test Requirements: The development of safety test requirements begins with the 
identification of SSRs [2]. Safety test requirements are provided to development of specific test cases to 
validate the SSRs. 
Software Safety Testing: Software safety testing is performed to ensure that hazards have been 
eliminated or controlled to an acceptable level of risk. It includes documenting and reviewing safety-
related test descriptions, procedures, test cases, and the associated qualifications criteria. Implementation 
of the SSRs must be verified [1]. 
3. Framework of Software Safety Testing 
Specification provided by the development has little consideration of safety at present, and software 
related losses arise from requirements errors, and these flawed requirements usually involve either 1) 
incomplete or wrong assumptions about the operation of the controlled system or the required operation of 
the computer or 2) unhandled controlled-system states and environmental conditions [6]. So, safety test 
engineers have to involve into the assessment and development of software safety requirements to 
improve the completeness and accuracy of the software safety requirements. Then select suitable test 
strategy based on the assigned Development Assurance Levels (DAL). Divide the SSRs into test items 
and get the software safety test requirements, then design specific safety test cases, implement safety test 
to verify the realize of the SSRs.  
In this paper, a framework of software safety testing includes 4 phases has been proposed based on the 
software safety engineering and software test theory: software safety test planning, software safety test 
design, software safety test implementation and software safety test assessment [7]. Main activities in 
software safety test planning include: get software safety requirements by software safety analysis, get 
software safety test requirements, and plan the software safety test effort. Main activities in software 
safety test design include design software safety test cases and build the safety test environment. Main 
activities in software safety test implementation include implement the safety testing and analysis the test. 
Main activities in software safety test assessment include software safety residual risk assessment and 
report the safety assessment. 
Figure 1 shows the framework of software safety testing. 
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safety effort is determined by the DAL. The safety testing activities should be sufficient to match the 
DAL and yet ensure that the safety requirements and constraints have been correctly implemented. 
Software Safety Test Design: 
x Design specific safety test cases according to the software safety test requirements. In addition to 
testing under normal conditions, the software should be tested to show that unsafe states cannot be 
generated by the software as the result of feasible single or multiple erroneous inputs [1]. 
x Assure the safety test regulation and build safety test environment.  
Software Safety Test Implementation: 
x Tests of safety-critical components should be conducted in strict accordance with the approved test 
plans, and the results should be accurately logged, recorded, and documented. Software safety tests 
may be included within normal tests to save time, cost, and resources, or may be separate tests [1]. 
x Two sets of analyses should be performed during the testing phase: 1) Analyses before the fact to 
ensure validity and completeness of tests; 2) Analyses of the test results. Analysis before the fact 
should, as a minimum, consider test coverage for safety-critical Must Work-Functions and Must-Not-
Work-Functions [1]. 
Software Safety Test Assessment: 
x The safety risk assessment of software is based on an assessment by the analyst that sufficient analysis 
and testing have been performed. This means sufficient analysis to identify the hazards, develop and 
incorporate safety requirements into the design, analyze SSRs implementation including sufficient 
testing (and analysis of test results) to provide a reasonable degree of assurance that the software will 
have a sufficiently low level of risk [2]. 
x The purpose of the safety assessment report (SAR) is to provide management an overall assessment of 
the risk associated with the system including the software executing within the system context of an 
operational environment. This is accomplished by providing detailed analysis and testing evidence, 
that all of the software related hazards have been identified and have been either eliminated or 
mitigated/controlled to levels acceptable. SAR should describe the overall risk associated with the 
software in the system context and their acceptance of that risk [2]. 
The issues of software safety mainly come from the incomplete, inaccurate or inconsistent software 
safety requirements. So, the critical part in software safety testing is to get complete, accurate and 
consistent SSRs, based on which software safety test requirements could be developed. 
4. Software Safety Test Requirements Elicitation based on STPA 
4.1. Software Safety Test Requirements Elicitation based on STPA 
During the software safety test process, one of the most important elements is complete and accurate 
SSRs. However, specification provided by development usually focus on function and performance, and 
with little consideration about safety. So, it’s necessary to use safety analyses to create new, or identify 
the SSRs. 
Traditional safety analysis techniques are extension of the hardware analysis into the software area, and 
are developed for the simpler, loosely coupled systems and become less effective as system complexity 
and coupling increases. Also, those analysis techniques work on an existing design. So, it’s necessary to 
find a new analysis technique for the safety testing in system-level testing to identify the SSRs. 
STPA is a method of hazard analysis and based on STAMP which considers system safety as a control 
problem and could be used before a design is complete. Accidents will occur if the safety constraints are 
violated by components in the safety control structure. Instead of viewing accidents as the result of an 
initiating event in a series of events leading to a loss event, they are considered to result from a lack 
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Command Missing or not provided Provided incorrectly 
Wrong timing or order 
causes hazard 
Stopped too soon or 
applied too long 
Interrogate an 
aircraft 
An aircraft will not 
be identified 
The information of the aircraft 
is identified inaccurately 
Identify an aircraft too 
late  Not applicable 
Interrogate an 
unknown target Not Hazardous 
An unknown target is identified 
as a friend Not Hazardous Not applicable 
The next step is to identify how and why these inadequate control actions could occur. It includes the 
casual elements based on general causal factors in STAMP model. For example, the causes of inadequate 
control action “the information of the aircraft is identified inaccurately” include that the interrogate 
command is send out but with a wrong signal, the response signal is wrong or arriving too early or too late, 
the algorithm to analysis the response signal is inadequate or display wrong. 
The safety test requirements derived from the safety requirements and the scenarios could include: test 
the software when the response signal is valid, test the software when the response signal is invalid, test 
the software when the response signal is arriving too early, test the software when the response signal is 
arriving too late, etc. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, a software safety test framework is proposed, and a software safety test requirements 
extraction method based on STPA is introduced and a practical application is given as an example to 
demonstrate how to put it into use. STPA analysis method also involves the environment, personnel, 
organizational and other factors, this article only focus on system failure and software fault. Further study 
would be implied on the complex sensory and human-related failures, and management, organizational 
and social factors related fault test. 
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